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A Legal Assessment of Gender Quotas in Politics 
Anne Peters and Stefan Suter 
lntroduction: Scenes of Switzerland 
In Switzerland, warnen were not enfranchised on the federal level until 1971. 
Of twenty-six cantons, the last to allow warnen to vote in cantonal elections was 
Appenzell-Innerrhoden in 1990. This reforrn was not rnade through legislative pro-
cesses, but only after female citizens cornplained to the Swiss Federal_ Supreme 
Court.1 
Despite late enfranchisernent, citizens in Swiss cantons actively campaigned for 
delegate quotas, particularly during the 1990s. Although ultirnately unsuccessful, 
carnpaigns airned at delegate quotas for warnen for federal political offices2 and in 
two cantons, Solothurn and Uri. In the Swiss systern of direct dernocracy, cantonal 
initiatives are scrutinized for their cornpatibility with the federal constitution before 
they are subrnitted to the people for a popular vote. Regarding the two cantonal quota 
initiatives, the Swiss Federal Suprerne Court issued decisions in 1996 and 1998.3 In. 
its first decision, the Federal Suprem_e Court considered a far-reaching proposal to 
reserve 50 percent of the seats of all elected offices in the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches in Solothurn for warnen. The proposal requested that all open 
positions be earrnarked for the underrepresented sex until men and warnen were 
represented "according to their proportion in the canton's population." The Court 
found this bill rnanifestly unconstitutional due to its "obvious- disproportionality" in 
curtailing active and passive voting rights.4 
1 Bundesgericht (BGer, Federal Court), Nov. 27, 1990, n6 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bun-
desgerichts (BGE) Ia 359 (Switzerland). 
2 Three federal popular initiatives (proposals for constitutional amendments) proposing gender quotas 
have been launched, but unsuccessfully. Two did not receive enough signatures to be put to a vote, 
and the third was rejected by 82 percent of the voters and by all cantons. 
3 See Swiss scholarship on this matter: Kathrin Arioli, ed., Frauenförderung durch Ouoten (Basel, 
Switzerland: Helbing and Lichtenhahn, 1997); Denise Buser and Tomas Poledna, "Politische Quoten 
auf dem Schafott - Reflexionen zum Bundesgerichtsurteil zur iSolothumer Verfassungsinitiative'," 
6 Aktuelle juristische Praxis 981 (1997). 
4 BGer, March 19, 1997, 123 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts (BGE) I 152 
(Switzerland). 
1 ---
i 
I· 
C. 
Representation, Discrimination, and Democracy 175 
In its second judgment, the Federal Supreme Court partly upheld a more moder-
ate initiative in Uri. The Court found unconstitutional a proposal in which "nearly 
half," but "at least one third" of members of public boards and institutions elected by 
the people must be women because this would unduly infringe on voters' rights. How-
ever, the Court upheld in part a similar proposal relating to political offices elected 
by the canton's legislature. lt found that a "one-third minimal quota" was a propor-
tionate and temporary measure and was thus consistent with the anti-disqimination 
clause of the Swiss Constitution and Article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).5 However, the proposal failed by a large majority 
in a popular referendum in Uri.6 Similar local initiatives were also defeated.7 
These appear to be the sole. instances worldwide in which the entire affected 
voting-age population was directly asked to decide on gender quotas in politics. The 
result is clear: Swiss citizens disapprove of electoral gender quotas. We suspect that 
people in other Western democracies would agree. 
What is at stake here? Electoral gender quotas are designed to increase women's 
presence in politics and, eventually, to transform the political landscape. To meet 
this goal, quota policies worldwide are spreading, despite the risks of discrimination 
and disruption of democracy. 
Women in Dernocratic Politks: Some Facts 
Although women were enfranchised in most democratic countries during the twen-
tieth century, most recently in Samoa, in 1990, 8 they are underrepresented in all 
national parliaments. In recent decades, there has been gradual but extremely slow 
progress. In February 2009, 18-4 percent of all members of parliaments (MPs) world-
wide were women.9 Although this is a low figure, it constitutes an increase by more 
than 50 percent over the last thirty years.10 
5 BGer, Oct. 7, 1998, 125 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts (BGE) I 21 (Switzerland). 
6 Rejected by 84 percent of the popular vote on June 13, 1999. 
7 In the city of Luceme, an initiative for enacting a 40 percent quota for municipal authorities and 
commissions was rejected with a 71 percent vote on March 12, 1995. In the city of Beme, an amendment 
of the community statute sought to introduce a 40 percent quota for the city council. This was rejected 
by a 68 percent vote on Sept. 10, 1995. 
8 More recently, several Arab Gulf states introduced or expanded women's suffrage in their popular 
assemblies (Bahrain in 2002, Oman in 2003, Kuwait and Qatar in 2005, and the United Arab Emi-
rates in 2006). However, elected officials hold little or no real power in these authoritarian regimes. 
Despite universal suffrage, warnen are currently not represented in the parliaments of Belize and 
of various oceanic microstates because no warnen were elected (Federated States of Micronesia, 
Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, status as of February 2009: see "Women in National 
Parliaments," Inter-Parliamentary Union, available at http://www.ipu.org/ [ accessed March 11, 
2009]). . 
9 All figures are as ofFebruary 2009, if not indicated otherwise. This figure aggregates the membership of 
upper and lower houses. "World Average," Inter-Parliamentary Union, available at http://www.ipu.org/ 
(accessed March 11, 2009). 
10 
"Warnen in Politics: 60 Years in Retrospect," Inter-Parliamentary Union, available at http://www 
.ipu.org/ (accessed March 11, 2009). 
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As of this writing, the highest proportion of female delegates sits in the Rwandan 
Parliament (56.3 percent). Apart from this special case, Nordic countries have the 
most female parliamentarians (41.4 percent). In the Americas, female delegates 
make up 21.8 percent. In Europe, female representation in parliaments amounts 
to 19. 3 percent, with a decisive drop in the parliaments of postsocialist/Communist 
countries after the political transformation and the abandonment of the Communist 
quota schemes. The lowest proportion of female parliamentarians is in the Arab 
states ( 9. 7 percent).11 
Electoral gender quotas are rules or agreements aimed at changing the com-
position of the pool of potential candidates (notably officeholders within political 
parties ), candidates who stand for election, or those elected. Quotas may be volun-
tary (prescribed by internal party regulations) or prescribed by law. Gender quotas 
were first introduced in the 1980s and have dramatically increased since then. The 
trend toward quotas has been incited by international norms and supported by the 
mobilization of warnen and the recognition by political elites that gender quotas 
convey strategic advantages.12 
Electoral gender quotas exi~t in 100 states in one of the mentioned forms. 13 In 
fifteen states, quotas are constitutionally entrenched. Quota provisions for national 
parliament elections are in force in forty-five states. In thirty-three states, there 
is regulation of quotas on the subnational level. Voluntary political party quotas 
exist in at least 169 political parties in sixty-nine states. Current quota types vary in 
different world regions.14 Parliamentary seats are reserved mainly in Africa, Asia, and 
the Middle East. Voluntary party quotas are most common in Western Europe, and 
electoral candidate quotas are found primarily in Latin Arnerica. 
Quota regulation also depends on the electoral system. Ouotas exist mostly in 
countries with a system of proportional voting in multimember constituencies. Con-
versely, electoral systems relying on single-member constituencies and a majoritarian 
(winner takes all) system (e.g., the elections to the U.S. Congress or the British House 
of Commons) can hardly accommodate quota schemes. 
Legally imposed quotas can be divided into two subgroups: reserved seats and 
candidate quotas. The former scheme exists, for example, in Afghanistan, Uganda, 
Rwanda, and India (at the local level). In those countries, the national constitu-
tion reserves parliamentary seats for women.15 Candidate quotas, which prescribe 
11 For more figures, see Table 9.1 in this volume. 
12 Mona Lena Krook, "Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas World-
wide," 2 Pol. and Gender 303 (2006). 
13 All figures on quotas are from the I1;1iternational Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA) (Stockholm, Sweden), "Global Database of Quotas for Warnen," available at 
http://www.quotaproject.org/ (accessed March 11, 2009). 
14 For international and transnational influences on the regional spread of quotas see Krook, "Reforming 
Representation," at 310-11. 
15 See Constitution of Afghanistan, Article 83(6), adopted on Jan. 4, 2004; Constitution of the Republic 
of Uganda, Article 78(1)(b ), adopted on Sept. 22, 1995; Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Article 
76(2), adopted on May 26, 2003; and Constitution oflndia, Article 243T(2), adopted on Nov. 26, 1949. 
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a minimum number of female party candidates on the ballot, without necessarily 
guaranteeing the election of warnen, are far more widespread. The most effective 
form of candidate quotas with placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms 
exists in four European states: France,16 Belgium,17 Portugal,18 and Spain. 19 In con-
trast, in ltaly, whose parliament has the lowest number of female MPs in Europe, a 
delegate quota bill was defeated in 2006.20 
The most frequent type of political gender quota is one with voluntary intemal 
party rules, which apply to intemal processes of candidate selection, the staffing 
of intemal decision-making bodies, or the nomination of electoral aspirants. In 
majoritarian election systems, intemal party quotas are the only realistic gender 
quota option. The first gender quota in the world was a party quota introduced in 
Argentina in the early 1950s by the Peronist Party for congressional elections. On 
a large scale since the 1980s, party quotas have been adopted by leftist, socialist, 
green, and radical parties, which write women's empowerrnent on their agenda, 
favor interventionist policies, and often have rnore female party officials dernanding 
quotas. 
ln.the United States, the Dernocratic Party introduced soft gender targets and rec-
ornmendations in its charter in 2005, but no hard quotas. 21 The Arnerican Republican 
Party Rules state that"each state shall endeavor to have equal representation of rnen 
and warnen in its delegation to the Republican National Convention."22 In Switzer-
land, the Federal Social Dernocrat Party has had a 40 percent quota for warnen on 
party lists since 1986, and the Green Party (Grüne Partei) adopted a 50 percent quota 
for warnen in 1987. In Gerrnany, the Green Party (now Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 
started in 1986 with a 50 percent quota for all ballot lists to party-intemal and par-
liarnentary elections. The sarne scherne has been endorsed by the Linkspartei. The 
16 Fifty percent quota, zipping mechanism, noncompliant lists result in a reduction of public subsidies 
for the party. Article L264 Code Electoral, as modified by the Lai no. 2007-128 of Jan. 31, 2007, 
Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran9aise (J.O.) (Official Gazette of France) of Feb. 1, 2007, at 1941 
(tightening the quota regulation of 2000). 
17 Fifty percent quota, the candidates on the first two list positions may not be of the same sex, non-
compliant lists are rejected. Article 117bis Code Electoral, as modified by the Lai portant diverses 
modifications en matiere de legislation electorale of Dec. 13, 2002, Moniteur Belge (Official Gazette 
of Belgium) of Jan. 10, 2003, at 809. 
18 Thirty-three percent quota, no more than two successive candidates may be of the same sex, noncom-
pliant lists result in a reduction of public subsidies for the party. Lei Organica 3/zoo6 of Aug. 21, 2006, 
Diario da Republica (Official Gazette of Portugal) of Aug. 21, 2006, at 5896. 
19 Forty percent quota, each sex must be represented by at least 40 percent in each tranche of five posts 
on a list, noncompliant lists are rejected. Article 44bis Regimen Electoral General, as modified by Ley 
Organica 3/zoo7 of March 22, 2007, Boletfn Oficial del Estado (Official Gazette of Spain) of March 
23, 2007, at 12611. See, on the constitutionality of this scheme, Spanish Constitutional Court (STC 
12/zoo8) (Jan. 29, 2008). 
20 The proposed legislation was defeated in the Senate on Jan. 24, 2006, by 41 to 34 votes, with 240 
lawmakers absent. Antonella Rampino, "Le votazioni in un'aula quasi deserta rendono sempre piu' 
difficile l'approvazione della legge," La Stampa, Jan. 25, 2006, at 5. 
21 Charter and bylaws as amended by the Democratic National Committee on Dec. 3, 2005. 
22 Rules of the Republican Party of Aug. 30, 2004, Rule 14, Sections ( d) and ( e) ( emphasis added). 
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German Social Democrats introduced a quota for women for all party offices and 
ballot lists in 1988.2 3 
Meanwhile, these party policies have induced more conservative parties to sponsor 
and nominate women candidates. Liberal parties that oppose quota regulations are 
hard-pressed to demonstrate that equal representation can be achieved without a 
straightjacket. Overall, voluntary party quotas are widespread, but in many cases, the 
quota targets are not met. 
In countries undergoing complete constit.utional and legal reform, there is a 
greater window of opportunity for the introduction of quota laws than in established 
regimes. Moreover, contemporary transition processe~ are tightly embedded in inter-
national law. In this context, it appears that gender balance in decision making is 
regarded as an important component of the regime's legitimacy, particularly in tran-
sitional and postconfüct states. Gender quotas are used as a means to reach this 
balance.24 
Some new state constitutions, which were framed under supervision of the inter-
natio.nal community and in cooperation with international bodies, such as in 
Afghanistan (Constitution of 2004) and lraq (Constitution of 2005), foresee gen-
der quotas for the national parliament.25 In Kosovo, the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Regulation 39 of 2000 established a 30 
percent quota for women among the first fifteen candidates on party lists for all local 
and national elections.26 The latter rule provoked both international and local resis-
tance. These reactions reflect the doubts about the sustainability of gender-balanced 
representation in previously authoritarian states that lack a liberal democratic 
tradition and, until recently, did not even allow women to participate in public 
affairs. 
Despite their adoption, electoral gender quotas are still controversial. lt is not 
coincidental that the word quota has been largely eliminated in our political vocab-
ulary. International documents and countless national statutes generally avoid the 
word, even when advocating and endorsing measures that amount to numerical 
a pportionmen ts. 
23 Since 1998, under the 40 percent rule, it is required that the ballot lists should be zipped, with the 
option of allocating every fifth place to someone of either sex. Both quotas (for party offices and for 
ballot lists) shall be temporary until 2013. 
24 In Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Kosovo, Mozambique, Rwanda, and South 
Africa. In a recent resolution relating to postconfüct regimes, the United Nations Security Council 
"urge[ d] Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels 
in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, 
and resolution of confücts," SC Resolution S/RES/i325 (2000), at para. 1. 
25 Constitution of Afghanistan, Article 83(6), adopted on Jan. 4, 2004; Constitution oflraq, Article 47(4), 
adopted on Oct. 15, 2005. 
26 Section 4.2 of UNMIK Regulation no. 2000/39 on the municipal elections in Kosovo of July 8, 
2000. 
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Legal Bases and Legal Limits of Political Gender Quotas 
Both voluntary party quotas and mandatory delegate quotas create a number of 
legal problems. These problems have attracted far less legal scrutiny than gender 
or racial quotas in business and education. 27 Gender quotas in politics have only 
been the subject of discrete litigation in judicial and arbitral bodies in Europe and 
the Americas, whose awards are in part inaccessible.28 Our analysis concentrates on 
the specific features of the democratic process that suggest a different assessment of 
electoral gender quotas than of quotas in the professional sphere. 
There is no hard international legal obligation to introduce quotas in domestic 
political systems. International conventions oblige state parties to enfranchise their 
female citizens. The most importantprovisions are Article 25 of the ICCPR of 1966,29 
Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Warnen ( CEDA W) of 1979,3° and Articles I to III of the Convention on the 
Political Rights of Warnen of 1953.31 However, none of these conventions requires 
gender-based numerical goals or quotas. 
Several instruments allow, or even encourage, states to take temporary special 
measures to promote gender equality. The rationale of these clauses is that the 
general principle of formal gender equality must be partly and temporarily set 
27 For employment quotas in the EU: ECJ, ECR 1995, I-3051-Kalanke; ECR 1997, I-6363 -Marschall; 
ECR 2000, I-1875 - Badeck; ECJ, ECR 2000, I-5539 - Abrahamsson. On quotas in education and 
procurement in the United States: Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Adarand Constructors v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In scholarship, Anne Peters, Women, Quotas, and Constitutions (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Kluwer, 1999). 
28 United States: Bachur v. Nat'l. Democratic Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987); Italy: Racc. Uff. corte 
cost., decision 422 of Sept. 6, 1995, Gazz. Uff., ia Serie speciale, 39, 1995, 15; United Kingdom: 
Industrial Tribunal Leeds, Jepson v. The Labour Party, decision of Jan. 19, 1996, IRLR 116 (1996); 
Switzerland: See sup. n. 4-5; Germany: FederalArbitral Tribunal ofthe Political Party, Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen, arbitral decision of Nov. 7, 1998, Neue Verwaltungsrechtszeitschrift-Rechtsprechungsreport 
1999, 546; France: CC decision 98-407, Jan. 14, 1999, J.O. of Jan. 20, 1999, at 1028; CC decision 
2006-533, March 16, 2006, J.O. of March 24, 2006, at 4446; Costa Rica: Supreme Election Tribunal, 
decision 1863 of Sept. 23, 1999; Columbia: Corte Constitucional de Colombia, decision (sentencia) 
C-371/00 of March 29, 2000; Spain: Spanish Constitutional Court (STC 12/2008) of Jan. 29, 2008. 
29 ICCPR, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force on March 23, 1976, see the relevant text of 
Article 25, discussed in the section "The Gender-Neutral Right to Run for Elections." 
3° CEDAW, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13, entered into force on Sept. 3, 1981, Article T "States Parties 
shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and 
public life of the country and; in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right: 
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected 
bodies; (b) To participate in the formulation of govemment policy and the implementation thereof 
and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of govemment" (emphasis 
added). 
31 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, March 31, 1953, 193 UNTS 135, entered into force 
on July 7, 1954, Article I (entitlement to vote without any discrimination); Article II (eligibility for 
election without any discrimination); Article III (entitlement to hold public office without any dis-
crimination). 
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aside to achieve substantive equality.32 In international practice, a consensus has 
emerged that gender-based quotas are, in principle, covered by these authorizations. 
The most important international clause on temporary special measures in favor 
of women is Article 4 of CEDAW.33 The CEDAW Committee views numerical 
goals connected with time frames and quota systems as a "measure" in the sense of 
Article 4.34 Both in General Recommendations and when discussing states parties' 
reports, the CEDAW Committee has recommended that states parties make more 
use of temporary special measures, including "positive action, preferential treatment 
or quota systems ... to advance women's irttegration into ... politics."35 Numerous 
other international institutions, including the Human Rights Committee36 and the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union,37 have formulated similar recommendations. 
The Beijing Platform for Action asked for "positive measures" to combat the low 
proportion of women among political decision makers, including setting "specific 
targets" to increase substantially the number of women "in all governmental and 
public administration positions."38 lt also endorsed a 30 percent target for women 
in decision-making positions.39 The General Assembly's Beijing + Five Resolution 
asked member states to "set and encourage the use of explicit short- and long-term 
time-bound targets or measurable goals, including, where appropriate, quotas, to 
promote pr?gress towards gender balance, ... especially in decision- and policy-
making positions, in political parties and political activities" and to encourage the 
nomination of more women candidates, inter alia, through quotas.4° 
On the regional level, additional Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention of 
Human Rights41 (ECHR) and numerous soft documents of the Council of Europe 
allow for, but do not mandate, temporary special measures ör positive action to 
32 Cf. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation no. 25 (2004), paras. 8 and 27. 
33 CEDAW, Article 4= "Temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between 
men and warnen shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but 
shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these 
measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have 
been achieved." 
34 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendations no. 5 (1988); no. 23 (1997), paras. 15 and 29; no. 25 
(2004), at para. 22. 
35 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation no. 5 (1988). See CEDAW Committee, General 
Recommendation no. 23 (1997), at para. 15, on "setting numerical goals and quotas." 
36 HR Committee, General Comment no. 28 (2000 ), at para. 29. 
37 Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Plan of Action to Correct Present Imbalances in the Participation of 
Men and Warnen in the Political Life," March 26, 1994, Section C, III-4; Inter-Parliamentary Union 
Assembly, "Beijing +10: An Evaluation From a Parliamentary Perspective," Resolution of Oct. 1, 2004, 
at para. 16. 
38 The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Warnen, Beijing, China, Sept. 1995, Platform for 
Action, Chapter G, "Warnen in Power and Decision-Making," paras. 186 and 190. 
39 Beijing Platform for Action, at para. 182, refers to this target as established by the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1990. 
4° GA Resolution A/RES/S-2i3 ofJune 10, 2000, paras. 66a) and Sib). 
41 Protocol no. 12 of Nov. 4, 2000 (entered into force on April 1, 2005), preamble: "The principle of 
non-discrimination does not prevent States Parties from taking measures in order to promote full and 
effective equality, provided that there is an objective and reasonable justification for those measures." 
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enhance female participation in political life.42 Within the European Union (EU), 
the Council recommended that the EU member states "promote a balanced partic-
ipation by women and men at all levels in governmental bodies and committees."43 
Acting upon that recommendation, the European Commission endorsed a 40 per-
cent quota for its expert groups and commissions.44 Finally, several international 
organizations in recent years embraced gender quotas in their staf:fing policies. 
The introduction of domestic gender quotas has been influenced by these clauses 
and recommendations. lt is no coincidence that the majority of Latin American 
countries that instituted legal quotas did so after the 1995 Fourth World Conference 
on Women in Beijing. 
Legal problems with electoral gender quotas exist in basically two dimensions: 
they may be discriminatory, and they may be undemocratic. In the first dimension, 
gender-based electoral quotas restrict competing male candidates' right to stand for 
elections on equal footing. The CEDA W Committee acknowledged this conflict 
when it emphasized that "States parties have an obligation to ensure that temporaiy 
special measures are clearly designed to support the principle of equality and there-
fore comply with constitutional principles which guarantee equality to all citizens."45 
In the second dimension, gender-based electoral quotas may interfere with the party 
members' rights to elect their officeholders in internal elections and (in general 
elections) with the voters' constitutional right to elect candidates in free suffrage. 
Furthermore, quotas imposed by the legislature on the parties to some extent conflict 
with the political parties' autonomy and may therefore be undemocratic. 
Discrimination 
In this section, we will demonstrate that narrowly tailored electoral gender quotas 
do not unfairly discriminate against men, although they are in tension with the 
principle of nondiscrimination. 
The Explanatory Report on Protocol no. 12, at para. 16, does not mention quotas and emphasizes that 
the protocol does not impose any obligation to adopt special measures. 
42 On temporary special measures for enhancing female participation in political life, see the Council 
of Europe (CoE) Declaration on the Equality of Women and Men of Nov. 16, 1988, at para. 11; 
Recornmendation (2003) 3 on balanced participation of women and men in political and public 
decision making, adopted by the CoE Committee of Ministers on Ma.rch 12, 2003, recommending 
that the govemments of member states "consider setting targets to a time scale with a view to reaching 
a balanced participation of women and men in political and public decision-making" and "positive 
action measures, which would facilitate a rn9re balanced participation of women and men in political 
and public decision-making" (recommendation V and appendix A.1, with "balanced participation of 
women and rnen" rneaning "that the representation of either warnen or men in: any decision-making 
body in political or public life should not fall below 40 percent," ibid., at 7; see also 22 and 24). 
43 96/694/EC: Council Recornmendation of Dec. 2, 1996, on the balanced participation of warnen and 
rnen in the decision-making process, OJ 2000 L 319, 11-15, Section I.4(a). The Council also called on 
the EU institutions to "design a strategy for achieving balanced participation" (Section II). 
44 2000/407/EC: Comrnission decision ofJune 19, 2000, relating to gender balance within the cornrnittees 
and expert groups established by it. OJ 2000 L 154, 34-35. 
45 CEDAW Cornrnittee, General Recornrnendation no. 23 (1997), at para. 15. 
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The Gender-Neutral Right to Run for Elections 
Technically speaking, different (national, international,. subnational, or European) 
anti-discrimination, equal protection, or equal opportunity norms are applicable to 
different cases, depending on the jurisdiction and the type of elections at issue. Some 
legal systems have special provisions on electoral rights46 or acknowledge unwritten 
voting rights. Male candidates' political right to stand for elections encompasses their 
entitlement to remain free from sex discrimination in this process. This entitlement · 
is a lex specialis of the more general right not tobe discriminated against on account 
of gender. General anti-discriminatio~ law thus supports the claim that no political 
aspirant or candidate should be given preference on the basis of gender, even without 
a specific guarantee of equal voting rights. Article 25 of the ICCPR expresses the 
core idea as follows: "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without 
any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 [ which comprises, inter alia, sex J ... to 
vote and to be elected at genuine periodical elections." 
Limitations and Balancing 
The prohibition on gender discrimination is not absolute, however. The Human 
Rights Committee, for example, acknowledged that stat~ parties may restrict the 
right to stand for election (as enshrined in Article 25 of the Covenant), provided 
that such restrictions are established by law and are justifiable by "objective and 
reasonable criteria."47 Similarly, the ECHR requires positive measures in favor of 
women to have an "objective and reasonable justification."48 
Under U.S. constitutional equal protection analysis, gender-based distinctions 
must be narrowly tailored to serve an important governmental objective.49 Although 
the right tobe a candidate in elections is not regarded as a fundamental right,5° gen-
der quotas must reasonably promote important ends, without unreasonably restrict-
ing the electoral rights of men. 
Thus reasonable measures of positive gender discrimination may lawfully restrict 
male passive electoral rights. Realizing genuine gender equality and broader fe-
male participation in politics, which is in many legal orders even constitutionally 
46 See, e.g., ICCPR, Article 25; Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR, Article 3; U.S. Constitution, Amendment 
XV; German Basic Law, Article 38; Swiss Constitution, Article 34. 
47 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25 (57), UN Doc. CCPR/Chi/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996), 
paras. 4 and 15. See also Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - CCPR 
Commentary, 2nd ed. (Kehl, Germany: N.P. Engel, 2005), para. 22.35. 
48 See Preamble of Additional Protocol no. 12; see also Explanatory Report, at para. 16. 
49 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 456 (1976). 
5° The Court need not employ strict scrutiny and the "compelling interest" test to all laws restricting 
candidate access to the ballot. See John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law, 
7th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson, 2004), at 1019-20. The Supreme Court has so far scrutinized the 
regulation of elections only with a view to their compatibility with First Amendment rights of the 
states' citizens and the rights of parties to political association. 
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entrenched, is an objective and reasonable purpose. Judicial decisions have espoused 
that view.51 A German arbitral tribunal found that curtailment of male candidates' 
rights, who were prevented by a political party' s zipping scheme from figuring on 
reserved listing slots, was justified by the German Constitution's mandate to realize 
substantial equality of the sexes (Article 3, Section 2, German Basic Law)Y A slightly 
different angle was taken by a U.S. Court of Appeals, which upheld a gender 
limitation on eligible candidates as a means to broaden public participation in party 
affairs, protected by the right of association.53 
Gender equality objectives must be balanced against men's fundamental right not 
to be discriminated against in the competition for political positions. The starting 
point should be the analysis of specific factors that impede the emergence of more 
females in the multistage political recruitmentprocess.54 Women must join the pool 
of eligibles, decide to become candidates, be nominated by their political parties, and 
then win elections. In all stages, women face socioeconomic, political, psychological, 
and ideological obstacles. Women are far less likely than men to emerge from füe 
pool of eligible candidates and to run.55 Although women have gained access to 
power through alternative structures, particularly in nongovemmental organizations, 
this is not a substitute for governmental and political party participation. 
Overall, the political sphere, being concerned with public affairs, seems to be -
more than the private sector - male coded. Political life is organized according 
to norms, values, and lifestyles that connote a certain type of masculinity. Politics 
implies competition and confrontation, winners and losers. Political action requires 
self-promotion, marketing, demagoguery, ruthlessness, and aggression - qualities 
that are culturally accepted in men but not in women.56 Consequently, women 
politicians are typically relegated to education, family affairs, health, and social 
policy, which rank low in the hierarchy of government functions. 
·The overall masculine image of politics may in:Ruence voters' attitudes. In the 
1990s, voters still considered female candidates less competent to handle the military, 
51 See, e.g., the Columbian Constitutional Court, decision (sentencia) C-371/00 of March 29, 2000, 
paras. 20-21. 
52 Federal Arbitral Tribunal of the Political Party, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (1998) (Germany) (sup. 
n. 28) in a lawsuit between a local party association and a state association of the party. See sup. 
n. 4-5 for the case law of the Swiss F ederal Court. 
53 Bachur, at 837. 
54 See for the following, besides the literature in the ensuing notes, Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, 
"The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Warnen Candidates at Different Levels and Types of 
Office," 46 Pol. Res. Q. 503 (1993); Andrew Reynolds, "Warnen in the Legislatures and Executives of 
the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling," 51 World Pol. 547 (1999); Pamela Paxton and Sheri 
Kunovich, "Women's Political Representation: The Importance ofldeology," 82 Soc. Forces 87 (2003); 
Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless, "Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for 
Office," 48 Am. J. Pol. Sei. 264 (2004); Joni Lovenduski, Feminizing Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2005), at 45-82; Nadezhda Shvedova, "Obstacles to Women's Participation in Parliament," in Julie 
Ballington and Azza Karam, eds., Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Stockholm: IDEA, 2005), at 33-50. 
55 Fox and Lawless, "Entering the Arena," at 275. 
56 Lovenduski, Feminizing Politics, at 54-
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war, and the economy.57 Today, voters may have grown more accustomed to warnen 
in powerful positions, and stereotypes may be weakening. Motherhood and a focus 
on children may become a political asset, a method of humanizing a candidate and 
connecting with voters. However, even recent empirical research notes a persisting 
public belief that men make better political leaders.58 
In addition, there are supply-side factors. Warnen come forward in the polit-
ical arena in smaller numbers than men, due to candidate resources (such as 
time, money, political connections, educational qualifications, experience, skills, 
and career flexibility) and motivational factors,59 limited party support, lower self-
confidence,60 and less media attention to women's contributions. 
Socioeconomic conditions also matter. Except in high offices, political engage-
ment is a pro bono activity. Many warnen who already shoulder a double burden do 
not wish to triple it by balancing family life, a professional career, and parliamentary 
work with its family-unfriendly schedule. Warnen are found in smaller proportions 
in influential brokerage professions from which national politicians are drawn. The 
lesser wealth and income of warnen creates gender-typical financial constraints and 
constitutes at least a psychological barrier against expensive political campaigning 
( even if empirical analysis suggests that a candidate's gender has only a minimal 
effect on his or her ability to raise funds). 
Finally, the electoral system has an impact on female participation in parlia-
ments. Majority systems have a disproportionately negative impact on warnen, 
whereas systems of proportionate representation tend to produce more gender-
neutral outcomes. 61 Another factor is the listing system. In closed list systems, where 
electors vote for parties, rather than candidates, the crucial stage is nomination by 
the party. If a sufficient number of warnen are nominated as candidates and placed 
in electable positions on party lists, female candidates have good chances. In con-
trast, open list systems, where the voter can alter the composition of the list, tend to 
contribute to the elimination of warnen candidates. 62 
57 Huddy and Terkildsen, "The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Differ-
ent Levels of Office," at 519-20. 
58 For current societal attitudes toward women across the globe, see the World Values Survey available 
at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (accessed March 11, 2009). See also Eileen McDonagh, Chapter 
9· 
59 Fiona Mackay, Love and Politics: Women Politicians and the Ethics of Care (London: Continuum, 
2001), at28;Jessica D. Nordell, "Positions of Power-How FemaleAmbition Is Shaped," Slate, available 
at http://www.slate.com/ (accessed Nov. 23, 2006); Shelley J. Correll, "Constraints into Preferences: 
Gender, Status, and Emerging Career Aspirations," 69 Am. Soc. Rev. 93 (2004). 
6° F or self-fulfilling prophecies of female incapacity, see Ilan Dar-Nimrod and Steven J. Heine, "Exposure 
to Scientific Theories Affects Women's Math Performance," 314 Sei. 435 (2006). 
61 Richard E. Matland, "Enhancing Women's Political Participation: Legislative Recruitment and Elec-
toral Systems," in Ballington and Karam, Women in Parliament, at 93-m. 
62 Julie Ballington and Richard Matland, "Political Parties and Special Measures: Enhancing Women's 
Participation in Electoral Processes," paper presented at the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gen-
der Issues and Advancement ofWomen (OSAGI) Expert Group Meeting on Enhancing Women' s Par-
ticipation in Electoral Processes in Post-conflict Countries, Jan. 19-22, 2004, EGM/ELEC/2004/EP.8, 
at 4-5. 
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t In sum, women's political activity faces structural barriers. While all institutional, 
social, economic, and cultural factors are in flux, and some causes of female under-
11 representation in politics are also likely changing, the barriers for women are, for 
!1 the time being, arguably higher and more entrenched than in professional life. 
ff On the other side of the balance, the nature of democratic elections limits male 
lt legitimate expectations and lessens the material burden for men. In politics, the 
f. nomination and election of a candidate as a party representative or officeholder 
• results primarily from the personal and political choices of party comrades and 
citizens. Principles of fair recruitment, based on education, university diplomas, 
and professional qualification, are of minor importance. Being a politician is not 
:, just another kind of job. Vatersare not obliged to strive for objectivity and neutrality, 
f: but instead are free to vote for candidates according to their personal preferences. 
1
: Ideally, voters should decide rationally, but the voters' right to decide in secret, and 
even arbitrarily, is part of the democratic process. In this context, the gender factor 
is no more illegitimate than a candidate' s personality or his or her ability to gain 
sympathy. 
Even without gender-conscious listing, male candidates cannot count on being 
' nominated, let alone being elected. 63 Therefore male candidates do not build 
' up legitimate expectations and are thus less burdened by delegate quotas than 
by employment quotas. They are also less burdened for material reasons. Being 
excluded from a job because of one's gender may seriously affect the discarded 
candidate's life, his status, wealth, and eventually, the subsistence of his family. In 
contrast, political engagement is, in most cases, not a professional activity. Discrim-
ination in this fi.eld has fewer material consequences. 
1 Political Parties' Internat Quotas 
Special considerations come into play for quotas that have not been introduced by 
law, but are entrenched only in statutes or charters of political parties. The Beijing 
Platform for Action specifically addressed political parties as well as governments and 
asked them to take measures to ensure women's equal access to and full participation 
in power structures and decisiön making. 64 Likewise, the CEDA W Committee 
encouraged political parties to "ensure that women have an equal opportunity in 
practice to serve as party offi.cials and tobe nominated as candidates for election" and 
mentioned "setting aside for women a certain minimum or percentage of positions 
on Party executive bodies."65 
Political parties are private associations. While they are an indispensable part of 
the political process and perform a quasi-public function, the gist of a liberal party 
63 The Spanish Constitutional Court (STC 12/2008), on Jan. 29, 2008, stressed that men do not have any 
constitutional right to be a candidate (Part B II 9). 
64 Beijing Platform for Action, sup. n. 38, at Chapter G, "Warnen in Power and Decision-Making," 
paras. 191 and 192. 
65 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation no. 23 (1997), paras. 28, 32, and 33. 
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democracy is that the parties are independent from govemment. This independence 
.affects the determination of whether there is unfair discrimination against male 
candidates. 
First, political parties themselves enjoy the right of association and of free speech. 
By introducing an intemal quota system, the party seeks to testify about its political 
attitude and implement a program that will lend credibility to its organization. 
Increasing the number of female participants in decision making is a legitimate 
political objective. This objective is not an arbitrary or anti-democratic element in 
party politics, but pertains to the exercise of the right of association. The parties' rights 
of autonomy and association give them the right to use quotas to select delegates. 66 
Because the parties' delegate selection methods also constitute free speech, the 
courts may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular expression as 
unwise or irrational. 
On the other hand, in the absence of a horizontal effect on fundamental rights, 
private associations are not directly bound to observe the constitutional fundamental 
rights of burdened male members. In most legal systems, constitutional equal pro-
tection or nondiscrimination clauses do not directly govem parties' personnel and 
candidate management. 67 Although the principles of equal protection and nondis-
crimination normally apply indirectly to the political parties' intemal structure and 
to their listing policy via laws and statutes,68 the standards tobe observed by the party 
as a private actor may be less strict than those goveming state action. 69 
Finally, the burden placed on men by intemal party quotas can be justified by 
their consent. Interna! party quotas are the result of democratic deci,sion making 
within the party itself. Male party members are part of this process and are free 
to initiate a renegotiation of quotas. By joining and staying in a political party that 
endorses quotas, male party members explicitly or implicitly accept the party's listing 
system. 
Formality, Temporariness, and Proportionality 
Gender quotas for intemal party offices and for the nomination of candidates for 
general elections do not invariably violate male candidates' right to be free from 
gender discrimination in the political nomination and election process. The greater 
need for political quotas and the relatively light burdens they impose distinguish 
66 Bachur, at 837. 
67 In the United States, it is disputed whether parties' delegate quotas constitute state action. If we qualify 
as state action all matters "integral to the electoral process" (Seergy v. Kings County Republican Comm., 
459 F.2d 308 [2d Cir. 1972]), the selection of party nominees is state action. But see Lisa Schnall, "Party 
Parity: A Defense of the Democratic Party Equal Division Rule," 13 f. Gender Soc. Pol'y and L. · 381, 
400-04 ( 200 5). 
68 E.g., the German Constitution requires political parties to observe a "democratic party structure" 
(Article 21(1) of the Basic Law). This provision obliges the parties to comply with basic democratic 
principles, such as the equality of members, in particular to grant equal suffrage and equal eligibility. 
69 Federal Arbitral Tribunal of the Political Party, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (1998) (Germany). 
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electoral quotas from employment quotas. However, there is a difference between 
reserved parliamentary seats and electoral quotas. Because reserved seats guarantee 
fixed results and eclipse a male occupation of those seats, they infringe on male 
candidates' rights more intensely. These quotas therefore need a stronger legal basis 
and should be written in constitutions. The few countries that do reserve seats for 
women in their national parliaments have constitutionally enshrined this measure.7° 
Electoral quotas constitute an admissible restriction upon formal gender neutrality 
and nondiscrimination if they are based in a formal law, are narrowly framed, and 
are temporary. Temporariness does not mean that time limits have tobe established 
from the outset, as long as it is ensured that the measures will be lifted when their 
goals are reached.71 The duration of a quota scheme may be determined by its 
functional result in response to a concrete problem and not by a predetermined 
passage of time. 72 , 
Ultimately, the assessment turns on the size of the quota. For instance, the Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court struck down a 50 percent quota for women but upheld 
a one-third quota.73 Too high quotas appear as an excessive curtailment of male 
candidates' rights. We leave open the question of how high is too high, which 
should be answered in light of the fact that existing quota laws have nowhere led 
to an increase in women's presence up to the height of the quota. Overall, formally 
entrenched, reasonably high, temporary political quotas do not unfairly discriminate 
against men. 
Democracy 
The more interesting question is whether gender-based electoral quotas are compat-
ible with democratic principles. Do quotas improve the democratic process because 
they increase the presence of women in politics, and - equally important - lead 
to more women-friendly policy outcomes? Numerous legal and political docu-
ments imply a positive answer. For instance, the CEDAW Committee asserted 
that "the concept of democracy will have real and dynamic meaning and lasting 
effect only when political decision-making is shared by women and men and takes 
equal account of the interests of both."74 On a regional level, the 1992 Athens 
Declaration, issued by a European Summit convened on the initiative of the EU 
Commission, proclaimed "the need to achieve a balanced distribution of public and 
political power between women and men" and asserted that "a democratic system 
7° See Constitution of Afghanistan, Article 83(6), adopted on Jan. 4, 2004; Constitution of the Republic 
ofUganda, Article 78(1)(b), adopted on Sept. 22, 1995; Constitution of the Republic ofRwanda, Article 
76(2), adopted on May 26, 2003; and Constitution oflndia, Article 243T(2), adopted on Nov. 26, 1949. 
7
1 BGer, Oct. 7, 1998, 125 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts (BGE) I 21, at 43 
(Switzerland). 
72 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation no. 25 (2004), at para. 20. 
73 See the section "Introduction: $.cenes of Switzerland." 
74 CEDAW Committee, GeneralRecommendation no. 23 (1997), at para. 14. 
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should entail equal participation in public and political life;" it also asserted that "a 
balance between warnen and men" contributes "to building a meaningful and lasting 
democracy."75 The 1996 Charter of Rome stated that warnen contribute to chang-
ing politics in terms of priorities, content, and decision-making practices; that the 
equal participation of warnen would reinvigorate democracy; and that democracy 
would "acquire a true and dynamic sense when warnen and men together define 
the values they wish to uphold in their political, economic, social and cultural life, 
and together take the relevant decisions."76 A European Council Recommendation 
of 2003 considered that "the realization of balanced participation of warnen and 
men in political and public decision making would lead to better and more effi-
cient policy making through the redefinition of political priorities and the placing 
of new issues on the political agenda as well as to the improvement of quality of life 
for all."77 
Contrary to these statements, electoral quotas might actually be undemocratic 
because they erroneously focus on numbers and on purely descriptive, as opposed 
to substantive, representation. The assessment depends on the underlying model of 
democracy and representation. 
Vaters' Choices and Political Parties' Autonomy 
lt has been asserted that quotas ort ballot lists unduly restrict the formation of the 
peoples' political will and conflict with constitutional and international guarantees 
of free suffrage. Similarly, quotas for party offices may unduly restrict the party 
members' right to choose candidates freely.78 However, the right to free suffrage 
only requires that the voters can elect candidates without being subject to extemal 
pressure. lt does not guarantee that specific candidates (male or female) will be 
presented. Citizens must accept the gamut of candidates offered by the political 
party. If a candidate has been put on the list because of her gender, this may 
simply provide an additional reason for the citizen not to give his or her vote to that 
candidate. The process of electing is not substantially modified by the quota. As 
long as the voter has the right to choose between competing candidates, his or her 
fundamental right to freely express his or her political will is not impaired. 
For the same reason, a party statute reserving certain list positions for female 
party members in intemal elections does not infringe on the party members' inter-
nal voting rights. The member~ remain free to decide which man or woman will 
75 Athens Declaration, issued at the European surnrnit ofWornen in Power on Nov. 3, 1992. 
76 Charter of Rorne, adopted at the European surnmit "Warnen for the Renewal of Politics and Society" 
on May 18, 1996. 
77 Recornrnendation Rec (2003) 3 on balanced participation of warnen and men in political arid public 
decision rnaking, adopted by the Council of Europe Cornrnittee of Ministers on March 12, 2003, 
preamble. See also CoE Recomrnendation 1269 (1995), "Achieving Real Progress in Women's Rights 
as Frorn 1995," paras. 1-2; EU Council Recornrnendation ofDec. 2, 1996, on the balanced participation 
of warnen and rnen in the decision-rnaking process (96/694/EC), OJ L 1996, 319, 11-15, at para. 9. 
78 Cf. Tashjian v. Republican Pa1ty of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,217,222 (1986). 
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receive a vote. Party quotas thus do not unduly restrict the voters' ( or party fellows') 
fundamental right to free elections. A different matter would be a legal obligation 
imposed on voters to prefer female candidates, which would unduly infringe popular 
sovereignty. 79 
Quotas imposed by law on political parties prima facie interfere with the polit-
ical party's autonomy. However, party autonomy is not unlimited. Various legal 
requirements for election procedures restrict the political parties' freedom to pro-
pose candidates, and these are generally considered legitimate. 80 But ballot quotas 
differ from those traditional limitations because quotas imply that the govemment 
takes side with a particular political agenda. Therefore quota laws could be consid-
ered an interference with the parties' program. However, this partiality is tempered 
by state laws that prescribe listing or ballot quotas for all parties. This intervention is 
admissible if it is endorsed by law or by the state constitution because it then forms 
part of the legal framework und er which all political parties are bound to operate. 81 
To conclude, quotas endorsed by law (preferably in a formal, parliamentary statute) 
do not infringe the political parties' legally protected autonomy. 
Quotas and Representation 
Electoral gender quotas are frequently thought to improve democratic represen-
tation. The merit of this argument depends on one' s understanding of political 
representation.82 Three relevant conceptions are descriptive, substantive, and sym-
bolic representation. Descriptive representation is representation of one' s kind, sug-
gesting that a democratic parliament should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the 
people. Descriptive representation has rarely been advocated as an end in itself, but 
instead rests on the assumption that the representative' s characteristics are a guide 
to the actions he or she will take. Put differently, descriptive representation may 
79 This had been foreseen by Article 6 of the 1998 Columbian statute on adequate and effective partici-
pation of women in decision making (proyecto de ley estatutaria N°fo/98 Senado y N°158/98 Camara) 
and was struck down as unconstitutional by the Columbian Constitutional Court, decision (sentencia) 
C-371/00 of March 29, 2000, paras. 58-59. 
80 Under Arnerican constitutional law, "a State may enact laws that interfere with a party's intemal affairs 
when necessary to ensure that elections are fair and honest." Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). 
For an Arnerican litigation concerning reserved seats, see Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 
489 U.S. 214 (1989), on a Califomia law requiring that the chair rotate between residents of northern 
and southern California. The Court held that the regulations over the internal affairs of the political 
parties violated the political parties' free association rights because they directly affected who would 
represent the parties. 
8i See, e.g., Spanish Constitutional Court (STC 12hoo8) of Jan. 29, 2008, Part B II 5-7. But see 
Columbian Constitutional Court, decision (sentencia) C-371/00 of March 29, 2000, at para. 69, 
holding as unconstitutional a legal provision prescribing a 30 percent quota for positions that may lead 
to popular elections because it constitutes a governmental intrusion into the internal organization of 
political parties and violates their autonomy. 
82 
See Andrew Revee, "Representation, Political," in Edward Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, vol. 8 (London: Routledge, 1998), at 270-72; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of 
Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), at 57.,...83. 
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matter because it enhances substanfive representation. Substantive representation is 
the representation of interests. Finally, parliamentarians may represent the citizens, 
or a nation, in a symbolic sense. This concept highlights that the composition of 
the political elite has a social significance and affects people's self-image in politics. 
Symbolic representation matters because a pattern of representation that gives no 
recognition to the communal attachments through which people live their lives 
is (in psychological and cultural terms) hardly tolerable, even when changing the 
pattern of representation would have no discernible impact on the kind of politics. 
A democratically elected parliament can probably best be understood as a mix of 
different kinds of representation, which are all relevant for the quota debate. 
Quotas and substantive representation 
The principal democratic argument in favor of political gender quotas is that they 
enhance the substantive representation of warnen' s interests, concerns, and needs 
and, in the lang run, transform the entire political process and its outcomes (beyond 
narrow women's issues). Along these lines, the Beijing Platform for Action stated 
that "warnen in politics and decision-making positions in governments and leg-
islative bodies contribute to redefining political priorities, placing new items on 
the political agenda that reflect and address women's gender-specific concems, 
values and experiences, and providing new perspectives on mainstream political 
issues."83 A European Council Recommendation claimed that women's presence 
in politics "is likely to give rise to different ideas, values and behavior which will 
result in more justice and equality in the· world for both men and women."84 The 
CEDAW preamble voices the states parties' conviction "that the full and complete 
development of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require 
the maximum participation of warnen on equal terms with men in all fields." 
Ultimately, the argument is that "taking into account gendered perspectives and 
involving both warnen and men in decision-making processes are a sine qua non 
of any democratic framework. Hence democracy, by definition, cannot afford tobe 
gender-blind."85 The CEDAW Committee also claimed that a female proportion 
of 30 to 35 percent would suffice to constitute a critical mass within political bo-
dies, which would change the style, the procedures, and the results of the political 
process.86 
All these claims rest on the premise that warnen as a group have specific interests 
and needs and that female politicians have, based on their specific social experience, 
different views, values, and skills. Female lawmakers and warnen in key political 
positions thus might bring about a different style of leadership and debate (less 
competitive and adversarial; more consultative and cooperative; more caring, open, 
and flexible;· more ready to listen) and might raise the moral tenor of politics. 
Warnen politicians are believed to be more altruistic than men, m~re concerned 
83 Beijing Platform for Action, at Chapter G, "Warnen in Power and Decision-Making," at para. 182. 
84 EU Council Recommendation of Dec. 2, 1996, at para. 12. 
85 Julie Ballington, Introduction to Ballington and Karam, Women in Parliament, at 24-
86 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation no. 23 (1997), at para. 16. 
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[1 with human consequences of policy, and more apt to pursue a politics of care. lt is 
!.! 
II also assumed that women' s presence will have a civilizing effect on parliamentary 
i: 
r culture because male parliamentarians will behave differently in the presence of 
i·: 
rJ women.87 On this basis, it is postulated that female politicians will redefine political 
li priorities, place new' issues on the political agenda, and implement different politics, 
ti not only in warnen- and family-related social and labor issues, but in all policy areas, 
/.} ranging from child care facilities to flexible working hours, education, environmental 
[i protection, disarmament, and peacekeeping. 
l
i However, these claims imply that strong gender differences and polarities exist. 
 They carry the danger of resurrecting dormant gender stereotypes and backfiring in 
t contemporary conditions, as long as softness is considered tobe nice for the ordinary 
1 political soldier but ina ppropriate at the very top of the political hierarchy. Moreover, 
1 pointing to distinct, authentic women's interests means to reproach deviant women 
1· as having false consciousness. Finally, the idea of a female advantage is irreconcilable 
j with democracy because it posits as a starting point exactly what democrats must 
.. deny, namely, that one citizen group's voice is intrinsically better, more deserving 
f of attention, more moral, than another group's voice.88 · 
i Therefore a more defensible claim is that even in the absence of a definable 
! female collective angle on politics, the simple fact that women still are, as a group, 
k relative newcomers in politics means that they do not know the codes and have lt 
* not yet been socialized to the conventional art of doing politics. For this reason 
alone, warnen might import new styles and practices of decision making.89 Overall, 
rather than relying on stereotypical assumptions, we should consider empirical 
a:· research demonstrating that an increased presence of women in parliaments does 
not necessarily improve the substantive representation of women' s interests and 
needs (see, on the empirical evidence, below). 
However, the focus on substantive representation may be too narrow. Indeed, sub-
stantive representation cannot explain fully all meanings and functions of political 
~: representation. In a strictly antipaternalist perspective, substantive representation of 
interests is impossible because every autonomous individual must determine his or 
her own interests. From that perspective, the possibility of substantively acting for 
.~ others breaks down. In any case, the constituency will, on many issues, not have an 
interest, or its members may have several conflicting interests. The representatives 
know of the voters' ignorance, apathy, and irrationality and of the diversity of their 
views and interests, so there is nothing ( or nothing clear) for the representative to 
represent in substance.9° 
If the interests of warnen could be objectively defined, we would not need female 
representatives. In fact, we would then not need chosen representatives at all. Virtual 
87 Marian Sawer et al., eds., Representing Women in Parliament - A Comparative Study (London: 
Routledge, 2006), at 17. 
88 
Phillips, Politics of Presence, at 75. ri 
89 Mercedes Mateo Diaz, Representing Women? Female Legislators in West European Parliaments (Essex, 
UK: ECPR Press, 2005), at 118. 
90 Pitkin, Concept of Representation, at 220. 
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representation ( even by a benevolent dictator) would suffice. However, as soon as we 
admit that interests and needs ( even if they may be gendered) cannot be precisely 
delineated, the emphasis shifts from an objectively defined set of interests and needs 
to a more exploratory notion. Then there is little to do but turn to the people who 
carry the interests. 91 
Quotas and descriptive representation 
The second argument for electoral quotas draws on descriptive representation. Vir-
tually all political actors acknowledge the serious underrepresentation of warnen in 
political institutions as a problem and desire membership of women in parliament · 
in proportion to their number in the citizenry to create a proper composition of the 
legislature. For instance, the Athens Declaration stated that "equality requires parity 
in the representation and administration of Nations."92 
The short formula for this idea is parity democracy. Parity is "the political expres-
sion of the fact that humanity is composed of two gendered halves and, there-
fore, its representative bodies must be analogously composed to be democratically 
legitimate."93 Recently, Blanca Rodrfguez Ruiz and Ruth Rubio-Marfn have made 
a strong argument for parity democracy. Their point is that the liberal state and the 
social contract are based on a fiction of the independence of (male) individuals, 
which must be stripped away. In reality- so the argument goes - all human beings 
depend on at least some others, and this weight of dependency has been shifted 
onto women. Women are thus excluded from the social contract, conceived of as 
a "sexual contract," and remain outsiders who enable it. "If democracy properly 
conceived must transcend the premises of the sexual contract, then parity - the 
equal presence ofboth genders in politics - is a democratic must."94 In order for the 
transition from the liberal to the democratic state "tobe fully achieved, the presence 
of men and women in parliament must be comparable, and if this does not happen 
spontaneously, it can and must be enforced."95 
However, this argument for descriptive representation is based on the premise 
that women stand for dependence (as opposed to male independence) and that 
only "a parliament composed of a similar number of men and women encompasses 
independence and the management of dependence in an equal manner."96 This 
premise is problematic but cannot be fully discussed here. 
91 Phillips, Politics of Presence, at 70. This is what Anne Phillips serninally called the politics of presence, 
as opposed to the politics of ideas. 
92 Athens Declaration, issued at the European surnrnit "Warnen in Power" on Nov. 3, 1992. See also 
the CoE Recornrnendation 1269 (1995), "Achieving Real Progress in Wornen's Rights as Frorn 1995," 
paras. 1-2; EU Council Recornrnendation of Dec. 2, 1996, on the balanced participation of warnen 
and rnen in the decision-rnaking process ( 96/694/EC), OJ L 1996, 319, 11-15, at para. 9. 
93 Blanca Rodrfguez Ruiz and Ruth Rubio-Marfn, "The Gender of Representation: On Dernocracy, 
Equality, and Parity," 6'I.Con: Int'l J. Const. L. 287, 302 (2008). 
94 Ibid., at 314. 
95 Ibid., at 289. 
96 Ibid., at 311. 
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In any case, to consider proportionate shares for the two genders in political 
institutions as a goal in itself ( or as a vehicle for rnanaging dependence) would be 
irreconcilable with individualist liberalisrn - even if we adrnit that gender differs 
frorn other societal divisions: A guarantee of proportional representation of (interest) 
groups is incornpatible with free elections whose outcomes are, by definition, · not 
predeterrnined. lt is no coincidence that the nondernocratic political systerns in the 
forrner socialist or Cornrnunist systerns abused parliarnentary quotas and policies 
of reserved seats to feign a fair, substantial representation of society in their parlia-
rnents, which had nothing to say anyway. Due to this undernocratic experience, 
· the govemrnents of postsocialist countries are reluctant to reintroduce quotas.97 So 
descriptive representation, and quotas as its vehicle, rnust be justified in different 
i terrns, notably as a vehicle for the better representation of diverse interests. lt is not 
' the underrepresentation of warnen that is unjust in itself, but the (assumed) resulting 
neglect of wornen's interests and needs. 
Adrnittedly, rnen are not per se precluded frorn representing the interests of 
warnen because one does not necessarily have tobe personally affected to represent 
interests in the political process. But cornrnon sense and experience show that both 
the political ideals and actions of the representatives and the interests, needs, and 
, beliefs of the represented are coshaped by personal and social experience, and are, to 
that extent, gendered. This clairn is not refuted by the variety and contradictoriness of 
wornen's interests or by their overlap with interests of certain groups of rnen. Despite 
variations, there are still issues that affect and interest warnen rnore than rnen. For 
exarnple, rnore warnen than rnen are exposed to sexual harassrnent and violence, and 
i as a group, warnen work in less prestigious and lower-paid or unpaid positions. The 
ll fact that voters' and legislators' political value judgrnents, interests, and needs are -
f' 
[; because they stern frorn personal experience - to sorne extent gendered supports the 
11 call for descriptive representation. 
j~ 
j; However, descriptive representation is in tension with the idea of dernocratic 
1
;. accountability. Generally, a wornan cannot be held accountable for what she is, but 
l/ 
11
1
;
1
,_ .•. for what she does. But how can elected warnen carry an additional responsibility to 
represent warnen? Is there a rnandate of difference attached to warnen politicians, 
:1 
l·! even in the absence of rnechanisrns to establish special accountability? Such a 
f;. rnechanisrn would run counter to the principle of the representatives' accountability 
il to all citizens and would appear, in that sense, undernocratic.98 
l
'j Despite these important ?~jections, de1cr~ptive repr~se~tation constit~tes one of 
\ several cornponents of pohhcal representahon. Descnphve representabon of the 
IJ genders is not entirely irrelevant because the dernocratic process does not only 
1 
consist of realizing particular prograrns or ideals ( or executing binding rnandates). 
Politics consists not just of irnplementing the choices the electorate has rnade or 
97 Cecile Greboval, "Introducing Parity Democracy: The Role of the International Community and the 
European Women's Lobby," in Francesca Bin da and Julie Ballington, The Implementation of Quotas: 
European Experiences (Stockholm: IDEA, 2005), at 156. 
98 Ibid., at 71. 
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· of realizing a coherent package of interests and beliefs neatly embodied in party 
programs. Because so much independent activity is required, it (generally) matters 
who the representatives are. 
Quotas and symbolic representation 
Finally, electoral quotas might improve the symbolic representation of women as 
a group. Because the absence of women reinforces strong, albeit subconscious, 
assumptions about inferiority, changing the composition of the elected assemblies · 
involves a ·more powerful and more visible assertion of women' s equality with men 
than changing the composition of the professions.99 Already the mere debate and 
media coverage accompanying the introduction of such a law makes gender parity in 
decision making and women's political leadership anational issue. By introducing 
quota bills in the national legislature, male legislators are forced to formulate and 
defend opinions about gender equality. 
Moreover, the visibility of women politicians potentially has a multiplier effect 
for the rights and the position of all women in society. Women politicians serve as 
role models, and the heightened presence of women in padiament is an important 
form of recognition of the equal status of women. The visible presence of women in 
public life might raise female aspirations, induce other women to engage in politics, 
and contribute to the broadening of career and life choices for women. 
In the context of political representation, quotas are hardly defensible as an 
efficient tool to increase numbers or to represent stereotypically conceived interests, 
but rather as a symbol. Underneath the deceptive simplicity of the arrangements for 
parity democracy lies the much more complex function of representation. Because 
politics is not only about self-interest, but also about self-image, the symbolic appeal 
for gender parity has a powerful political pull. 
The Real Effects of Political Gender Quotas 
"Female" Political Preferences and Performance? 
Empirical research only partly confirms the premise that underlies the quest for 
substantive representation of women, namely, the assumption that women, as a 
group, have distinct interests, needs, and outlooks and, consequently, specific polit-
ical preferences. A slight gender gap in political attitudes and voting behavior has 
been demonstrated.10° For instance, female voters in the United States tend to hold 
more egalitarian attitudes.101 A gender-focused Swiss analysis of voting behavior in 
popular referendums of the last decade revealed no gender gap on most policy issues. 
Small but statistically significant differences were found only in select policy areas: 
99 Phillips, Politics of Presence, at 81. 
100 John D. Griffin and Brian Newman, "Does Descriptive Representation Produce Political Equality?," 
paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 
2005. 
101 Susan E. Howell and Christine L. Day, "Complexities of the Gender Gap," fo J. Pol. 858 (2000). 
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women tended tobe slightly more supportive of environmental protection, tended to 
support disadvantaged groups, and supported tax raising more readily than men.102 
These findings can probably be extrapolated to other Western democracies. 
A different question is whether female representatives really perform different 
politics. According to the critical mass theory, the mode of interaction in groups 
depends on their size. As long as a subgroup forms a small minority within a larger 
group, its members, for example, women, are only token and adapt to the rules of the 
game of the dominant subgroup. Only when the subgroup has reached a certain size, 
so the argument runs, will its members behave differently.103 The critical mass theory 
is not supported by empirical research. The behavior of women in political bodies is 
apparently not crucially influenced by their number, but depends on institutions.104 
For instance, the high percentage of women in Scandinavian politics has not 
resulted in different politics on the federal level but seems to have changed_ local 
politics.105 
There is anecdotal evidence for a better accom;modation of women' s concerns 
by female politicians. Many empirical studies on American,106 Argentinean,107 
102 Claude Longchamp and Lukas Golder, Die Entscheidungen von Frauen schützen Umwelt, Service 
Public und Benachteiligte, Bericht zur Vox-Trend-Berichterstattung für das Jahr 2006 (Bern; Switzer-
land: gfs.bem, 2007). Findings are based on votes from 1999 to 2006 in sixty-seven federal initiatives 
and referendums covering the entire policy spectrum. 
103 Seminally, Rosabeth Kanter Moss, "Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios 
and Responses to Token Warnen," 82 Am. J. Soc. 965 (1977). For political life, Drude Dahlerup, 
"From a Small to a Large Minority: Warnen in Scandinavian Politics," 2 Scandinavian Pol. Stud. 275 
(1988). 
104 Leading critique by Janice D. Yoder, "Rethinking Tokenism: Looking Beyond Numbers," 5 Gender 
and Soc. 178 (1991). See also Donley T. Studlar and Ian McAllister, "Does a Critical Mass Exist? A 
Comparative Analysis of Women's Legislative Representation Since 1950," 41 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 233 
(2002); Kathleen A. Bratton, "Critical Mass Theory Revisited: The Behavior and Success of Token 
Warnen in State Legislatures," 1 Pol. and Gender 97 (2005). 
105 Kathleen A. Bratton and Leonard P. Ray, "Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Munic-
ipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway," 46 Am. J. Pol. Sei. 428 (2002). 
106 See, on the impact of the sex of members of Congress on U.S. legislation, Karin L. Tamerius, 
"Sex, Gender, and Leadership in the Representation of Warnen," in Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Rita 
Mae Kelly, eds., Gender, Power, Leadership, and Govemance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997), at 93-112 (small gender cgfference with regard to the support offemale agenda items). 
See, on gender-specific debate and leadership style in the parliament of Colorado, Lyn Kathlene, 
"Power and lnfluence in State Legislative Policymaking: The lnteraction of Gender and Position 
in Committee Hearing Debates," 88 Am. Pol. Sei. Rev. 560 (1994); Lyn Kathlene, "Position Power 
Versus Gender Power: Who Holds the Floor," in Duerst-Lahti and Kelly, Gender, Power, at 167-
93; Lyn Kathlene, "In a Different Voice," in Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox, eds., Women and 
Elective Office - Past, Present, and Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), at 188-202; 
John M. Carey et al., "Are Warnen State Legislators Different?," in Thomas and Wilcox, Women and 
Elective Office, at 87-102 (finding signifi.cant gender differences); Sarah Poggione, "Exploring Gender 
Differences in State Legislator's Policy Preferences," 57 Pol. Res. Q. 305 (2004) (finding that warnen 
hold more "liberal" preferences). 
107 
Mala N. Htun and Mark P. Jones, "Engendering the Right to Participate in Decision-Making: Electoral 
Quotas and Women's Leadership in Latin America," in Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux, eds., 
Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2002), 
at 32-56 (no significant priority differences between male and female legislators for categories often 
identified as of traditional interest to warnen, i.e., health care/public health, education, welfare/social 
security, environment). 
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British,108 and EU politics109 conclude thatmale and female decision makers espouse 
slightly different positions and that they lead in a slightly different style. Finally, 
female politicians seem to promote honest govemment. The greater the representa-
tion of warnen in parliament, the lower is the level of corruption. u0 
However, the existence of female positions and styles does not yet guarantee 
tangibly different political outcomes. Some research even suggests that precisely 
the female (more cooperative, more contextual) approach has tended to prevent 
the translation of distinct political objectives into results. At the same time, when 
lengths of tenure and institutional positions are taken into account, the gender 
differences in legislative accomplishments of parliamentarians appear narrow and 
subtle. Legislative effectiveness is primarily a function of seniority and of the rep-
resentative's specific institutional position. Membership in important parliamentary 
institutions, such as influential committees or the majority party, matters more than 
gender.m 
These findings support the hypothesis , that greater participation of warnen in 
. parliaments and powerful committees will modify law and politics in favor of warnen. 
However, the measurable gender-typical political attitudes and competencies are in 
flux. lt is therefore unsurprising that the increase of female parliamentarians and 
members of govemment has led to a convergence ofboth genders' political attitudes, 
though the cause is unclear. Some assert that warnen still tend to assimilate to 
men,112 while others report the contrary.u3 The expectation of a backlash when 
female presence oversteps a certain size, with male members of institutions resisting a 
female discussion style and warnen' s agendas, has been confirmed by some studies, u4 
but not by others. 115 
These empirical findings warn against an overestimation of the role of gender in 
policy making. Nonetheless, the current openness of the empirical question whether 
female parliamentarians do change political style and substance does not warrant 
dropping the claim for gender parity. Proponents of increased female presence in 
parliaments are not bound to prove that women politicians would make a difference 
because no argument from justice can be made in favor of the male dominance 
108 Pippa Norris, "Warnen Politicians: Transforming Westminster?," 49 Parliamentary Aff. 89 (1996) 
(small gender difference). 
109 Hilary Footitt, Women, Europe, and the New Languages of Politics (London: Continuum, 2002). 
110 David Dollar et al., "Are Warnen Really the 'Fairer' Sex? Corruption and Warnen in Government," 
46 J. Econ. Behav. and Org. 423 (2001). 
m Alana Jeydel and Andrew J. Taylor, "Are Warnen Legislators Less Effective? Evidence From the U.S. 
House in the 103rd-105th Congress," 56 Pol. Res. Q. 19 (2003), at 26. In this sense, see also Noelle 
Norton, "Warnen, It's Not Enough to Be Elected," in Duerst-Lahti and Kelly, Gender, Power, at 115, 
116, 124. 
112 Lovenduski, Feminizing Politics, at 174-75. 
113 Marcia Lynn Whicker and Malcolm Jewell, "The Feminization of Leadership in State Legislatures," 
in Thomas and Wilcox, Women and Elective Office, at 163-74. On convergence, see also Jay Barth, 
"Gender and Gubernatorial Personality," 24 Women and Pol. 63 (2002). 
114 Cf., e.g., Kathlene, "Position Power Versus Gender Power," at 189; Kathlene, "In a Different Voice," 
at 196. 
115 Bratton and Ray, "Descriptive Representation," at 435. 
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in political representation. The burden of proof rests on the defenders of the status 
quo.116 
Political Gender Quotas as a Means to Increase Female Presence 
Having established descriptive and symbolic representation of the genders as a legit-
imate objective, and working on the rebuttable assumption that female politicians 
do make some difference (which supports the case for substantive representation), 
it remains to be seen whether gender quotas in fact contribute to increasing the 
presence of women in legislative bodies. Empirical studies have yielded contradic-
tory results. At least some case studies revealed a positive relationship between the 
implementation of a quota and the achievement of higher numbers of women in 
parliam.ent.117 To date, twelve of the fifteen democratic countries in which female 
representation in parliament is highest possess delegate quotas.118 
However, while quotas apparently boosted women's presence by some percentage 
points, the quotas were not met. The average level of representation for women in 
political bodies in countries with electoral quotas is only slightly higher than the 
worldwide average of 18-4 percent of female parliamentarians. Notably, in France, 
the tangible success of the constitutionally imposed electoral gender quota was at 
first modest. The original parity law of 2000, a 50 percent quota without a robust 
placement mandate,119 produced little change in the first elections to the French 
National Assembly under the parity regime.120 
In sum, no straightforward correspondence exists between the speci:fic quota 
requirements that political parties or national legislation have imposed and the sex 
balance in legislatures. Current quota schemes have achieved only limited success 
because they often lack crucial elements, to which we will turn now. 
Necessary Components of Effective Quota Schemes 
The modest results of gender quotas can be attributed to inadequate legislation. 
Tobe fully effective, political gender quota legislation must comprise the following 
116 Phillips, Politics of Presence, at 65. 
117 See, on Bangladesh Shvedova, Ballington and Kararn, Women in Parliament, at 34; Medha Nani-
vadekar, "Are Quotas a Good Idea? The Indian Experience With Reserved Seats for Warnen," 2 Pol. 
and Gender 119 (2006), at 119-20. · 
118 In five of those fifteen states, only party-intemal quotas exist. Three states' constitutions rnandate 
quotas; four have legislative quotas. Three states have no quotas of any kind (see Inter-Parliarnentary 
Union, Horne page, available at http://www.ipu.org/ [accessed March 11, 2009]; International IDEA, 
"Global Database of Quotas for Warnen," available at http://www.quotaproject.org/ [accessed March 
11, 2009]). We leave out Cuba (third in the world, with 43,2 percent fernale delegates) becau;e this 
state does not rneet the rninirnurn standards of an electoral dernocracy. 
119 Article 2 of the Loi no. 2000-493 of June 6, 2000, J.O. ofJune 7, 2000, at 8560, arnending Article 264 
of the French Electoral Code. 
120 The nurnber of fernale deputies in the French National Assernbly increased frorn 10.9 percent (1997) 
to just 12.3 percent (2002). 
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elements. First, the size of the minimum percentage of women tobe included on the 
list is important. Second, quotas work only if they are complemented by a placement 
mandate in a closed list system, prescribing that women must be placed in electable 
positions, not at the bottom of the ballot lists or in other purely ornamental positions. 
Electable positions can be created by the requirement that every third or even second 
ballot list position must be filled with a female candidate (zipping mechanism). A 
case in point is the previously discussed female representation in the French National 
Assembly, which, only after the introduction of a zipping mechanism, rose from 12. 3 
percent in 2002 to 18.5 percent in the 2007 elections.121 
Third, monitoring and regulatory mechanisms must be installed to ensure party 
compliance. Noncompliance sanctions on political parties may include financial 
penalties or the denial of electoral registration of political parties that do not comply 
.wit~ the law. Compliance can also be fostered by incentives. Offering additional 
media time or additional public funding122 to parties that place women in high 
positions on party lists is a promising strategy. Narrowly tailored, these instruments 
are constitutionally admissible deviations from the governrnent's obligation to treat 
political parties equally because they serve a legitirnate purpose. 
Additionally, quotas need to be accornpanied by a series of other rneasures. Cru-
cial cornplements are both capacity building, for example, through rnentoring by 
experienced women, and the removal of structural barriers to the political represen-
tation. of warnen. Such rneasures should concentrate on the root causes that prevent 
female candidates frorn standing for elections. Organizations focusing on wornen's 
issues_ can help increase the number of warnen considering entering politics. A 
wornan who can draw on resources and support from a warnen' s organization is 
more likely to run and will also be rnore readily accepted by the party apparatus as 
a viable candidate.123 
Beyond capacity building, the removal of structural barriers includes carnpaigns 
directed at raising awareness of the irnportance of equal participation ofboth genders 
in political life, targeting warnen for appointrnent to ballot lists, and the creation of 
infrastructure that relieves women frorn household and child care burdens. Specif-
ically, financial constraints could be elirninated by financial assistance for female 
political aspirants. 
121 Article 2 of the Lai no. 2007-128 of Jan. 31, 2007, J.O. of Feb. 1, 2007, at 1941, amended Article 2 as 
follows: "La liste est composee alternativement d'un candidat de chaque sexe." 
122 The CoE Committee ofMinisters Recommendation 3 (2003) urged member states to "consider action 
through the public funding of political parties in order to encourage them to promote gender equality" 
(Appendix, proposed legislative measure A.4). In France, Article 9-1 of the Act on Financial Trans-
parency of Political Life links the allocation of public funding to the number of warnen candidates 
a party nominates for election (Lai no. 88-227 of March 11, 1988, J.O. of March 12, 1988, at 3290, as 
modified by Lai no. 2003-327 of April 11, 2003, J.O. of April 12, 2003, at 6488). In Costa Rica, the statute 
on the promotion of social equality of warnen (Ley no. 7142 of March 2, 1990) obliges political parties 
to employ a portion of governmental funding for electoral campaigns for measures to promote the 
political education and participation of warnen (see, on this obligation, Part IX of the decision of the 
Supreme Election Tribunal, Costa Rica: Supreme Election Tribunal, decision 1863 of Sept. 23, 1999). 
123 Ballington and Matland, "Political Parties and Special Measures," at 3. 
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Without all these supporting measures, quotas work badly and have been a rel-
atively painless way to pay lip service to women's rights without male politicians 
suffering the consequences. The general perspective suggests that quotas are not 
the decisive factor for increasing women' s access to legislatures. Other structural 
cornponents may matter more. 
This assessment does not render political gender quotas per se legally inadmissible. 
However, it gives rise ~o a presumption of the unconstitutionality of isolated quotas 
because those are doomed tobe ineffective. Overall, only properly embedded quotas 
·. rnight - if at all - slightly improve symbolic representation, and possibly improve 
·· desc,riptive and substantive representation of women. . 
r ·. conclusion 
).,,· 
f: : Electoral gender quotas have recently boomed in democratic states. This prolifera-
i, tion was catalyzed through international and transnational law and politics. Quotas 
r for women in politics are, compared to employment quotas, not very problematic 
f. under the angle of discrimination. However, they crucially affect democratic re-
., : presentation. 
i . The purely numerical results of quota laws, and thus their effects on descriptive 
{ ·.· _representation, have been modest. Electoral quotas have barely increased the female 
· presence in parliaments when introduced as a single measure. They only seem 
tq work when accompanied by placement requirements, compliance incentives, 
.F'. strict enforcement, and complementary policies. Because in liberal parliamentary 
h :~ultiparty democracies, the political parties remain the most important actors to 
+!:/promote or impede women's empowerment, the political will of party leadership 
;: ;':reinains decisive. Governments can only regulate the internal party structure to 
z: · ~ limited extent, but they may impose legal requirements for the parties' listing 
·t„ schemes. ~~ t'- .: . 
r··_. ·._.·.·A different question is whether women's descriptive representation, as improved 
it • by quotas, actually translates into the substantive representation of their interests. 
};'.·.:: 
,~.J· 
Empirical studies have demonstrated that the gender impact on political activity is 
., . srnall. This is unsurprising, given the fact that political actors' convictions are deter-:f .. t(,, . rriined by their parties' program and that delegates are tied into party discipline and 
{'. inst1tutions. Moreover, subgroups among men and women have diverging interests 
·:andvalues. Changing the composition of the elected parliaments does not guaran-
:(. , tee that women' s needs or interests will be addressed. The only guarantee would be 
(;i)>ne grounded in an essential identity of women, which is not plausible. Besides, 
;[// there is no institutional mechanism to secure the accountability to women orga-
L'. nized as a separate group. In sum, quotas are not operative for improving substantive 
:L\\tepresentation. 
f/}:( Separate from the uncertainty as to whether a more gender-balanced legislature 
\};{\fill address a new set of concerns, the presence of women in parliaments has an 
T't!{,/Illportant symbolic value. Because representation is, to some extent, a myth, the 
·f!':,.>r:: 
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pure visibility of warnen, and thus their place in this rnyth, rnay help to overcorne 
gender stereotypes. On the other hand, the focus on quotas and nurnbers risks losing 
sight of the real rnechanisrns of political power. Woinen need tobe in the backroorns 
where deals are struck. They must be opinion leaders arnong the party elites, where 
party policy prograrns are forrnulated and priorities are assigned, and hold seats on 
influential cornrnittees and in party caucuses. 
Overall, it is not even clear whether the presence of warnen in greater nurnbers 
on the parliarnentary floor, supported by quotas, is a necessary, far frorn being a 
sufficient, condition for warnen' s voices to be heard. Quotas rnight, to sorne extent, 
even be counterproductive. There is the danger that quotas breed cornplacency 
and overshadow, and thereby stall, other necessary rneasures for the advancernent of 
warnen. They allow political parties to rnake seerning concessions to warnen without 
addressing structural problerns. 
Ultirnately, we need to shift our attention away frorn the quantitative aspect to 
the qualitative changes in our political culture and institutions. The regulatory ideal 
rernains that laws and policies should reflect and reconcile rnany diverse needs 
and concerns, and, if necessary, eclipse sorne. Electoral gender quotas should rnark 
the beginning of the road to gender equity and not the end. As ternporary special 
rneasures, political gender quotas should not becorne permanent. They rnay (if at 
all) be an enabling tool for a transformation of the democratic culture, but only an 
auxiliary one. 
